Business Cycles: Theory, History, Indicators, and Forecasting by Victor Zarnowitz
This PDF is a selection from an out-of-print volume from the National Bureau
of Economic Research
Volume Title: Business Cycles: Theory, History, Indicators, and Forecasting
Volume Author/Editor: Victor Zarnowitz




Publication Date: January 1992
Chapter Title: The Regularity of Business Cycles
Chapter Author: Victor Zarnowitz
Chapter URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c10379
Chapter pages in book: (p. 232 - 264)8 The Regularity of
Business Cycles
8.1 Introduction
Do business cycles have predictable periodicities? Do their phases die of
old age? Or are the observed fluctuations merely random walks without past
regularities of predictive value? These questions are central to modem mac-
roeconomic dynamics and they have prompted a considerable amount oftheo-
retical and empirical analysis. Yet the answers differ, with no apparent conver-
gence to an agreement. There is much support for the notion that business
fluctuations are just random deviations from growth trends, but also for theo-
ries that stress the essential regularity of features and even the uniformity of
causes ofexpansions and contractions in macroeconomic activity.
This analytical situation is clearly both unsatisfactory and not uncommon.
It could be due to any or all of the following: the controversial nature of the
underlying issues and strong prior beliefs ofthe inquirers; neglect or selective
use of the evidence; loose concepts and diversity of the business cycles of
experience.
In this chapter, an attempt is made to comprehend the problems behind this
apparent impasse by reviewing the literature and historical evidence. This ap-
proach lacks the terse elegance, but also the frequently spurious precision, of
a single quantitative model or formula: the informed judgment it yields may
well be more dependable.
This chapter was originally presented at the conference "Approaches to the Business Cycle" at
McGill University, Montreal, Canada, on 25 March 1988. I thank the participants, and particu-
larly the discussant, AnnaJ. Schwartz, for valuable comments. Any remaining errors are mine.
I would also like to thank Phillip Braun for valuable research assistance and Christine Verhaaren
for efficient typing. Support from the Graduate School ofBusiness ofthe University ofChicago,
the National Bureau of Economic Research, and the Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation is
gratefully acknowledged. The research reported here is part of the NBER's research program in
Economic Fluctuations. Any opinions expressed are those of the author and not those of the
NBER.
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Past studies, at the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) and
elsewhere, have shown a persistence of sequential relationships and interac-
tions among time series representing a wide range of economic, financial, or
other variables. The common features ofbusiness cycles observed in the prin-
cipal market-oriented economies consist mainly of the structure of lags and
correlations connecting these "cyclical indicator" series. On the whole, this
line of work suggests the existence of a recursive system that plays a central
role in the generation and propagation of business cycles. It stresses the en-
dogenous and deterministic, rather than the exogenous and random, elements
of the process but stops short of expecting the longer-than-seasonal business
fluctuations to have similar durations and amplitudes over time. This report is
concerned only with the overall dimensions of business cycles, not with the
characteristic interplay ofthe indicators, but the measures it presents are gen-
erally consistent with the view ofthe cycle just outlined.
The next section examines the implications ofthe NBER chronologies and
other findings for the question, How regular in duration have business cycles
been? There are brief discussions of the hypotheses and evidence concerning
the incidence and coexistence of cycles with different periods-short, inter-
mediate, and long. Some new pieces of evidence are introduced and assess-
ments made. The analysis is extended to fluctuations in detrended series
("growth cycles") for the United States and other major countries since 1948.
The third section considers different theories for what they imply about the
regularity of business cycles. The relevant concepts vary over a wide range:
linear models with damping and white-noise shocks, models ofthe "political
business cycle," and nonlinear models with limit cycles orirregularly oscillat-
ing growth. The problem of asymmetry in cyclical behavior deserves and re-
ceives particular attention, and some data and tests bearing on it are provided.
I then approach the questions raised in the opening paragraph above in a dif-
ferent way, by considering the role ofcalendar versus historical time, and the
predictability and costs of business cycles. The last section sums up the re-
sults.
8.2 Durations and Periodicities
8.2.1 Business Cycle Chronologies
The earliest dates ofbusiness cycle peaks (P) and troughs (T), compiled in
annual terms from limited but well-explored information, suggest that be-
tween 1790 and 1860 both Great Britain and the United States experienced
business cycles of the same overall frequency (14) and average duration
(about 4.5 years). Table 8.1, however, also indicates that the individual phases
and cycles varied greatly in length for both countries but particularly for the
United States. Relative to the corresponding mean durations, the standard de-
viations tabulated for Britain have a range of 30%-63% and an average of234 Chapter Eight
Table 8.1 Duration ofBusiness Cycles in Great Britain and the United States, Annual,
1790-1858
Expansion Contraction Cycle Cycle
(Tto P) (P to T) (T to T) (Pto P)
No. of Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Period Cycles (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Great Britain
1792-1826 7 3.6 1.5 1.1 0.4 4.7 1.5 4.7 1.4
182&-1858 7 3.0 1.5 1.6 1.0 4.6 1.6 4.6 2.3
1792-1858 14 3.3 1.5 1.3 0.7 4.6 1.5 4.6 1.8
United States
1790--1826 7 2.8 1.6 2.4 1.9 5.1 3.0 4.6 1.5
182&-1855 7 2.4 1.5 1.7 1.1 4.1 1.7 4.2 1.7
1790--1855 14 2.6 1.5 2.0 1.5 4.6 2.4 4.4 1.6
Sources~' Great Britain: Bums and Mitchell 1946, table 16, p. 79; United States: 1790-1833, Thorp
1926, pp. 113-26; 1834-55, Bums and Mitchell 1946, table 16, p. 78. See also Moore and Zamowitz
1986, table A.2 and pp. 743-46.
Note: All entries are durations in years. P stands for peaks and T for troughs according to the annual
chronologies. S.D. = standard deviation.
42%; for the United States the range is 33%-79% and the average is 54%. In
Britain all but two of the expansions lasted 2-5 years and all but two of the
contractions lasted 1 or 2 years. In the United States four expansions were
shorter than 2 years and one was longer than 5 years; four contractions ex-
ceeded 2 years.
For periods between 1854 and 1938, monthly and quarterly as well as an-
nuallists ofreference dates are available for the two countries from the NBER
study by Bums and Mitchell (1946); the chronologies for France and West
Germany are somewhat shorter. The summary measures in table 8.2 indicate
a substantial dispersion ofthe durations ofbusiness cycles and their phases as
dated by the NBER. The S.D.lmean ratios (coefficients of variation) average
40%-60% for expansions, close to 70% for contractions, and over 40% for
full cycles, based on the longest periods listed (lines 4, 11, 14, and 17). The
ranges ofduration in months for the cycles before 1939 are as follows:
Expansions
Contractions

















Thus conventional measures show large differences over time between the
observed fluctuations in general economic activity, in terms of both overall
length and division by upward and downward movements, for each ofthe four235 The Regularity of Business Cycles
Table 8.2 Duration ofBusiness Cycles in Four Countries, Monthly, 1854-1982 and
Subperiods
Expansion Contraction Cycle Cycle
(T to P) (Pto T) (TtoT) (P to P)
No. of Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Period Cycles (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
United States-All Cycles
1. 1854-1919 16 27 10 22 14 48 19 49 18
2. 1919-1945 6 35 26 18 14 53 22 53 32
3. 1945-1982 8 45 28 11 4 56 27 55 30
4. 1854-1982 30 33 20 18 12 51 22 51 24
United States-Peacetime CycleSO
5. 1854-1919 14 24 7 22 14 46 19 47 19
6. 1919-1945 5 26 15 20 13 46 16 45 28
7. 1945-1982 6 34 15 11 4 46 13 44 19
8. 1854-1982 25 27 12 19 13 46 16 46 20
Great Britain
9. 1854-1919 11 42 13 30 22 70 29 73 30
10. 1919-1938 5 26 24 20 10 47 21 45 33
11. 1854-1938 16 37 18 26 19 63 29 64 33
France
12. 1865-1919 11 32 16 26 18 58 25 61 28
13. 1919-1938 6 24 11 15 8 39 14 38 10
14. 1865-1938 17 29 15 22 16 51 23 52 25
West Germany
15. 1879-1919 7 40 15 29 20 69 24 69 30
16. 1919-1932 3 29 12 23 15 40 18 53 22
17. 1879-1932 10 37 14 27 18 63 25 64 28
Sources: Bums and Mitchell, 1946, table 16 and chap. 4; Moore and Zamowitz 1986, table A.3 and pp.
745-54.
Note: All entries are durations in months. For abbreviations see note to table 8. 1.
aExclude the wartime expansions (Civil War, World Wars I and II, Korean War, and Vietnam War), the
immediate postwar contractions, and the full cycles that include wartime expansions and postwar con-
tractions.
countries covered. But these statistics include outliers-some very long and
very short expansions and contractions-which are relatively few and far be-
tween. It is important to allow for stochastic and exogenous elements in busi-
ness cycle dynamics.
Here one might note first the tendency of wartime expansions to be pro-
tracted and ofimmediate postwar contractions to be brief. This is most appar-
ent for the United States, mainly because peacetime expansions were on the
whole longer in the other countries. When wartime cycles are excluded, sub-
stantially lower variability measures result, as shown in table 8.2 for the236 Chapter Eight
United States (cf. lines 1-4and 5-8). The coefficients ofvariation are reduced
from 61% to 44% for expansions and from 43% to 35% for trough-to-trough
cycles, 1854-1982.
The requirements for periodicity can be relaxed by treating the extreme-
duration classes as "outliers." Ten of the· 14 U.S. peacetime cycles of 1854-
1919 had expansions in the range of 1.5-2.5 years, and 10 had contractions
in the range of 1-2 years. All but 2 ofthese cycles (86%) lasted 2.5-4.5 years
from trough to trough. This way of looking at the duration figures brings out
better their central tendency, that is, the predominance in this era ofAmerican
economic history of relatively short business cycle phases as defined by the
NBER.
Note that even this truncation still leaves room for much variability (the 1-
year ranges amount to a doubling ofthe lengths ofthe phases). Nevertheless,
some contributors to the field are content to bestow the attribute of"periodic-
ity" upon fluctuations so distributed.] This may be semantically legitimate,
but the common practice seems to define periodicity more strictly. At any rate,
judging from the NBER historical chronologies alone, business cycles are
indeed best described as "recurrent but not periodic." This characterization is
part of the much-quoted working definition of Mitchell 1927 and Bums and
Mitchell 1946, which has survived well several decades of active research
applications and testing.
In Europe business cycles were on the average longer and hence fewer than
in the United States. Thus in the common period 1879-1938 trough-to-trough
cycles numbered 17, 13, 14, and 10 in the United States, Great Britain,
France, and Germany, respectively. The mean duration ofthe American cycles
in that period was 4 years; the corresponding figures for the other economies
are approximately 4.5-5.5 years. To account for most of the early cycles in
the foreign countries, it is necessary to work with ranges ofseveral years. Of
the 11 British cycles of 1854-1919, for example, 7 lasted 4.5-8 years; 9
expansions were 2.5-4.5 years long, and 7 contractions were 2-3.5 years
long. The results for France and West Germany are not very different. 2
The average duration of phases during the interwar period (1919-38) is
similar to that for the earlier decades in the case of the United States (table
8.2, lines 5 and 6). The phases are shorter than their pre-1919 counterparts
elsewhere, except for the long contractions in Britain, where the economy was
1. A very clear example is Britton 1986; see pp. 1-4 for his general discussion of this issue
with references to the literature. For an alternative treatment, see ch. 2 above.
2. Friedman and Schwartz raise the possibility that the greater number ofturning points in the
NBER reference chronology for the United States as compared with the United Kingdom may be
due to the relatively greater abundance ofstatistics for the United States (1982, pp. 308-9). They
note that the extra U.S. turns are concentrated primarily in the pre-1914 period, for which the
U.K. chronology was based on scanty data; but also that the role of the British economy in
the world was changed drastically by World War I, which may have also altered the pattern ofthe
U.K. cyclical behavior. Their own chronologies differ little from those of the NBER: they omit
two ofNBER's U.K. dates (the 1901 trough and the 1903 peak) and add two U.S. dates (the 1966
peak and the 1967 trough) (1982, p. 74).237 The Regularity of Business Cycles
generally depressed much of that time (lines 9-10, 12-13, and 15-16). The
dispersion measures are relatively high, reflecting the particularly diverse ex-
periences ofthis turbulent era.
8.2.2 Multiple-Period and Long-Wave Hypotheses
The Bums-Mitchell definition imposes on business cycles certain minimum
requirements of amplitude and scope as well as length, but only in very gen-
eral and flexible terms. It thus allows for a great diversity of behavior, yet it
treats the cycle as a single category. But some scholars prefer to use different
concepts, which lead to hypotheses ofseveral interacting cycles, each with its
own characteristic frequency. It is then the combination of concurrent cycles
with different intensities and durations that produces the seeming lack of pe-
riodicity. Different factors are responsible for major and minor cycles and per-
haps still shorter subcycles. The existence of one or two types of a much
longer wave comprising a number ofthe NBER-dated business cycles has also
been asserted and investigated. It is clear that these approaches require more
complex analyses and larger data bases than the common-cycle hypothesis.
Here it is important to recognize that business cycles involve numerous
activities and are not adequately represented by specific cycles in any single
variable; also, that no comprehensive time series exist to cover their long and
varied history. For these reasons, it is more difficult to assess the relative am-
plitudes than the relative durations of business cycles, and indeed we know
less about the former than the latter. But tests of models with multiple peri-
odicities must rely on differences in the size as much as on those in the length
ofgeneral economic fluctuations.
It is of course likely that durations and amplitudes of cyclical movements
are positively correlated. The prevalence of short and mild recessions is con-
sistent with this presumption. But the relationship is not easy to document and
probably not strong, though it seems clearer for expansions than contractions
(ch. 7, sec. 6; also Moore 1961, pp. 86-93). Certainly, the length offluctua-
tions is not a very reliable indicator of their size. Some of the U.S. contrac-
tions were long and severe (1839-43, 1873-79, 1929-33); some were long
but moderate (1882-86, 1902-4); still others were short but severe (1907-8,
1937-38). Similar examples can be found for other countries.
Over nearly 150 years between the American Revolution and the low point
of the Great Depression, U.S. wholesale prices followed long upward trends
in three periods (1789-1814,1843-64, and 1896-1920) and long downward
trends in three intervening periods (1814-43, 1864-96, and 1920-32). In
each of the intervals of secular inflation (deflation) expansions were long
(short) relative to contractions. This relationship was also repeatedly observed
and confirmed in the British, French, and West German data (Bums and
Mitchell 1946, ch. 11; Moore 1983, ch. 15; Zamowitz and Moore 1986, pp.
525-31). The dates of the uptrend-downtrend sequences in the price levels
provide fair approximations to the "long waves" proposed by Kondratieff in238 Chapter Eight
1926 and adopted with various modifications and interpretations by a number
of economists over the years. 3 The long price movements are attributable
largely to trends in money and credit creation and related influences of gold
discoveries and wars. In the short run, prices generally tend to move procyli-
cally around their longer trends, which presumably reflects a dominant role of
fluctuations in aggregate demand.
A downswing phase of a long wave is supposed to be associated with aver-
age growth rates oftechnological innovation, capital formation, and industrial
production that are lower than those in the preceding and following upswing
phases. According to van Duijn 1983 (pt. 3), the results based on composite
indexes aggregated across the main capitalist economies are broadly consist-
ent with these hypotheses, whereas the tests for the individual countries tend
to be negative, which is attributed to "national peculiarities" (p. 154). But
there are so few of the long-wave phases that such results can hardly be con-
clusive. The evidence for the "1st Kondratieff" (before 1842-51) is shown to
be defective. In the post-World War II period, the "4th Kondratieff" prosper-
ity phase is dated 1948-66, followed by a "recession" in 1966-73 and a
"depression" in 1973-. But this chronology is, to say the least, doubtful. The
1970s and 1980s have been much less depressed than the previous periods so
classified, 1872-83 and 1929-37. Growth rates have declined but are positive
most ofthe time in most places, and there is no general deflation and financial
crisis.
More generally, the problem of identifying the long-wave turns with the
available data is a truly formidable one (for early times, because ofthe paucity
and defects ofthe information; for recent times, because ofinevitable trunca-
tions and revisions). The smoothing out of the effects of other, much more
pronounced movements (both the shorter cycles and the longest trend) pre-
sents no lesser difficulty. Several old and new tests of the long-wave and
composite-cycle hypotheses produced largely negative results (Bums and
Mitchell 1946, ch. 11; Adelman 1965; Howrey 1968). But here again the
scarcity of relevant observations is a major problem, particularly for the tests
based on spectral analysis. This recently favored method is well suited for the
task ofdiscovering hidden periodicities but only in relatively long, stationary,
and homoscedastic time series, that is, under conditions that clearly do not
obtain in the past context.
There is much disagreement about the very existence of some of the long
waves even among the supporters of the concept, and more disagreement yet
about the timing of the waves and their phases. This is in sharp coctrast to
business cycles, where chronologies from different sources are not very differ-
ent and the NBER reference dates are widely accepted and used. There is
3. These include Schumpeter (1939); Dupriez (1947, 1978); Rostow (1978, 1980); Mandel
(1980); and van Duijn (1983), who provides a useful critical survey ofliterature and evidence.239 The Regularity of Business Cycles
probably no better proofthat the uncertainties surrounding the long waves are
indeed unusually large.
Industrial production and early estimates oftotal output, when smoothed to
reduce the influence of shorter business cycles, show 15- to 20-year fluctua-
tions in the growth rates for the United States between 1840 and 1914. These
movements, clearly associated with waves in the level ofconstruction activity,
are known as Kuznets cycles. Their explanation relies heavily on the role of
population growth and notably the tides of immigration from Europe as
sources ofboth additional labor supply and demand for new housing and other
capital goods. The demographic forces are treated as interacting with eco-
nomic developments, not as exogenous variables. Other important factors in
these analyses include growth retardations in Europe, territorial and railway
expansions in America, changes in the current balance and international cap-
ital flows, and constraints on the money supply under the prevailing specie
standard.
Much has been learned from the literature dealing with these developments
(e.g., Kuznets 1930; Burns 1934; Long 1940; Abramovitz 1964; Easterlin
1968). But some of the central elements in the Kuznets cycles as sketched
above are now recognized as belonging to history. This type of fluctuation,
therefore, is no longer evident in recent times, even though it is probably not
entirely unrelated to long-term deviations from trends in the interwar and
post-World War II periods (Abramovitz 1968; Rostow 1975).
8.2.3 Major and Minor Cycles
Unlike the deeply hidden long wave and the building cycle that apparently
ceased to operate some time ago, major and minor cycles certainly exist as
two very different categories, at least at the descriptive level. One can hardly
object to this distinction as exemplified by the sequences of 1929-33-37 (the
deepest contraction and a large but still incomplete recovery, both very long)
and 1957-58-60 (a moderate and short interruption of growth). What is not
so clear is how to define the major and minor cycles more precisely: whether
they constitute a true, systematic dichotomy, and whether at least some major
cycles consist oftwo or more minor ones.
Juglar (1862) was the first to observe that fluctuations in prices, interest
rates, and other financial variables often lasted about 7-11 years. Kitchin
(1923) stressed the primacy of 3- to 4-year cycles; the major cycles were to
him "merely aggregates" of two or three minor ones (p. 10). In time it came
to be widely believed that business investment in machinery and equipment
plays a central part in the major, or Juglar, cycles, and inventory investment
in the minor, or Kitchin, cycles. The former involve longer decision and im-
plementation lags than the latter. Fixed capital lasts for years and cannot be
adjusted to desired levels nearly as quickly as inventories that are normally
disposed ofin days, weeks, orat most months.240 Chapter Eight
The NBER chronologies cannot be dichotomized into the Kitchin and the
Juglar durations. Ofthe 14 cycles in Great Britain from 1792 to 1858, 6 lasted
3-4 years, 6 lasted 5-6 years, and 2 lasted 7 years each from trough to
trough. The corresponding U.S. cycles include 3 of 2 years each, 4 of 3-4
years, 4 of5-6 years, and 3 of 7-9 years. The monthly data used for 1854-
1938 permit more detail. Let the classes of 30-54 months and 78 months or
more serve as the Kitchin and Juglar durations, respectively: they would ac-
count for 31 % and 25% ofthe observations for Britain, and 71 % and 10% for
the United States. The rest would fall in between, except for a few very short
fluctuations. These measures, then, are definitely affirmative only on the his-
torical prevalence ofshort cycles in the U.S. chronology.
Schumpeter (1935) held that "every Juglar so far observed . . . is readily
... divisible into three cycles of a period of roughly forty months" (p. 8).4
Nor surprisingly, no arrangement of the NBER consecutive business cycles
into groups of three corresponds to the Juglar dates attributable to Schumpe-
ter. Instead, his nine Juglar cycles marked off by troughs between 1848 and
1932 can be approximated by four groups of two cycles each, four of three
cycles each, and one single cycle (Bums and Mitchell 1946, pp. 440-42).
But there is no good reason to insist on any particular fixed scheme of so
many Kitchins per Juglar, and a more relaxed approach may be more instruc-
tive. When major cycles are marked off by troughs of severe depressions ac-
cording to the U.S. monthly reference dates (in 1879, 1894, 1908, 1921, and
1933), their successive periods are roughly 15, 14, 13, and 12 years. The
corresponding dates for Great Britain are not far off and they yield similar
durations, namely, 16, 14, 13, and 11 years. These periods include 4,4,4,
and 3 successive business cycles in the United States, and 2, 3, 3, and 3 busi-
ness cycles in Great Britain. Bums and Mitchell admit that this result "sug-
gests a fair degree of uniformity" and, upon further analysis, find some evi-
dence of "a partial cumulation of successive cycles." Nonetheless, they
conclude that "the [observed] relations are not sufficiently regular. . . to jus-
tify us in regarding the business cycles separated by severe depressions as
subdivisions oflong cycles" (1946, p. 460).
This is a tentative judgment conditioned by the deficient, available data, not
a decisive rejection of all notions of periodicity. But whatever configurations
ofminor and major cycles may have prevailed in the halfcentury here consid-
ered, they did not continue in the following era. The short but severe slump of
1937-38 occurred only 5 years after the end ofthe Great Contraction of 1929-
33. After World War II, U.S. business expansions grew much longer and their
durations more dispersed, in comparison with the pre-1945 and especially the
pre-1919 cycles. This was due in large part, but by no means only, to the
4. Schumpeter also calculated that "the two complete Kondratieff units ... contain each of
them six cycles of from nine to ten years' duration." He attributed periodicities of54-60 years,
9-10 years, and 40 months or "somewhat less" to the Kondratieff, Juglar, and Kitchin cycles,
respectively. His full treatment admits some exceptions (1939,1:161-74).241 The Regularity ofBusiness Cycles
incidence of wars (cf. lines 1-8, cols. 1-2, in Table 8.2). On the other hand,
contractions became much shorter and much less variable (cols. 3-4). Ofthe
eight recessions since 1948, even the longest and largest (1973-75, 1981-82)
were far less severe than earlier depressions, such as those of 1920-21 and
1937-38, let alone 1929-33 (see ch. 2, sec. 2.2, above; Moore and Zarnowitz
1986, pp. 767-71).
Thus ifmajor cycles were to be defined as involving deep depressions, they
could not be found at all in the economic history ofthe United States after the
1930s. What can clearly be identified is fluctuations in growth rates of total
output that lasted longer than the average business cycle. Specifically, in
1948-55 and 1955-61, real GNP rose at compound annual rates of4.4% and
2.2%, respectively. This period of 13 years included four recessions. In 1961-
73 growth measured in the same terms was 4.0%; in 1973-86 it was 2.3%.
This period of25 years also included four recessions. But no indication ofany
definite periodicities emerges from this division.
To see this, note that the first of these two extended retardations was less
than half the length of the second one, and the end of the latter is as yet
undetermined. Note also the uneven incidence ofbusiness cycle phases within
the two periods: 1948-55 and 1955-61 include two recessions each, 1961-73
only one, and 1973-86 three. Since 1973, growth rates fell well below the
previous experience and expectations in all major capitalist economies. This
may be due to a variety ofsources ofchanges in labor and capital productivity
distinguished in the studies of "growth accounting" (Maddison 1987). Oil
price rises have attracted particular attention, but policy errors and disruptions
first of high inflation and then disinflation are probably also among the major
immediate causes ofwhat happened.
To be sure, there is room for different interpretations ofhistory, the more so
the earlier and less reliable are the data. Long-wave proponents such as van
Duijn perceive three Juglars in the postwar era, 1948-57, 1957-66, and
1966-73 (1983, ch. 9). But there was no business recession in the United
States in 1966, only a short and mild slowdown; also, this breakdown does
not produce any large differences between growth rates in output for the ag-
gregate ofthe major countries (1983, p. 154).
Matthews (1959, pp. 208-10), using troughs in all contractions of manu-
facturing production except the shortest ones, counts seven major cycles for
the United States between 1876 and 1938, with durations averaging 9 years
(standard deviation, 3; range, 4-13). But he observes that "the periodicity is
not really very good" and that "the circumstances surrounding the middling
depressions were so diverse that it is difficult to regard them as the manifesta-
tion of a regular cyclical tendency" (1959, p. 211). Hence, he sees "distinct
forces making for periodicity" at work only in the cycles of3-4 and about 20
years, which were dominated by movements in inventory investment and
house-building, respectively (1959, p. 214-15). For Great Britain, Matthews
notes the early dominance of major cycles (of which four occurred in the242 Chapter Eight
relatively peaceful period 1825-65) ranging from 8 to 12 years and averaging
10 years (in addition to more numerous shorter and milder fluctuations). Be-
tween 1874 and 1907 four additional peak-to-peak cycles in national income
occurred, lasting from 7 to 10 years and averaging 8 years, but these are at-
tributed mainly to an alternation of two much longer, unsynchronized swings
in domestic and foreign investment, a situation seen as unlikely to recur
(1959, pp. 215-26).
In short, it is fair to say that direct inferences from time-series data in an-
nual or shorter units, without resort to any elaborate smoothing or filtering
procedures, lend little support to the concept ofwell-defined periodicities that
apply to economic fluctuations across time and space. It is in the work ofthose
authors who are sympathetic or committed to this concept that the problems
encountered by the periodicity hypotheses are most visible.
8.2.4 Fluctuations in Detrended Series
The measures in Table 8. 1 and 8.2 are based on the consensus of move-
ments in time series that include long-term trends as well as cyclical fluctua-
tions (only the seasonal variations are routinely removed). Alternative chro-
nologies have been constructed from comovements of cyclical dimensions
found in trend-adjusted data. In the upward (downward) phases of these
"growth cycles," the economy grows at an average rate higher (lower) than its
long-term trend rate. Hence not only absolute declines but also sufficiently
large and long slowdowns can and do give rise to such detrended cycles.
Retardations often precede contractions, and then growth cycles have
shorter upward phases, earlier peaks, and longer downward phases than the
corresponding business cycles; that is, they are more nearly symmetrical.
Sometimes a major slowdown occurs but no contraction follows, as in 1951-
52, 1962-64, and 1966-67 in the United States (more recently, the period
1984-86 also turned out to fall into the same category). So growth cycles
outnumber business cycles. However, it is also possible for a low-growth
phase to include a short and incomplete business cycle recovery, though only
one case of this sort has been documented so far: 1975-82 witnessed two
business cycles but only one growth cycle.
When very strong upward trends prevail, growth cycles may replace busi-
ness cycles; that is, phases of below-normal but still positive growth occur
instead of contractions. In the long sweep of modem history, this appears to
have happened on a large scale only in Europe and Japan during the great
post-World War II reconstruction ofthe 1940s and 1950s. The condition may
therefore be a temporary and uncommon one, except perhaps for small na-
tions engaged in the process ofrapid industrialization and buildup ofexports.
It is the observed postwar development that led to the contemporary definition
of "growth cycles" and their dating for many countries (Mintz 1969; Klein
and Moore 1985).
Since trends vary across the different indicator series for each country and243 The Regularity of Business Cycles
generally also over time, their elimination might well reduce both the tempo-
ral variability and the spatial differentiation of the observed fluctuations. One
would therefore wish to compare growth cycles with business cycles with
respect to their regularities.
Table 8.3 suggests, first, considerable similarity between the durations of
growth cycles in the principal economies with relatively unrestricted private
enterprise and trade. The high-growth phases averaged 30-39 months for
eight of the countries covered; 22 and 19 months for the United States and
Canada. The low-growth phases averaged 17-22 months, except for United
Kingdom and West Germany, with 28 and 30 months, respectively. Total
growth cycles, whether marked off by troughs or peaks, lasted on the average
a little over 4 years (about 5 years for Switzerland and 3 years for Canada,
to take the range). Some of the discrepancies reflect differences in the time
coverage. Inspection of the dates of successive growth cycles in the differ-
ent countries reveals a good deal of correspondence between these chronolo-
gies. This confirms the old lesson that most ofthe larger fluctuations are trans-
mitted or diffused internationally (see Moore and Zarnowitz 1986, sec. 8, for
detail).
Second, the variability of growth cycle durations over time is less than that
of business cycles but still large. For the United States, 1948-82, standard
deviations are 50%, 52%, 45%, and 34% ofthe mean lengths ofhigh-growth
phases, low-growth phases, trough-to-trough growth cycles, and peak-to-
peak growth cycles, respectively. The corresponding ratios for business ex-
pansions, contractions, and total cycle durations are 61 %, 67%, 43%, and
47%. The range is 25-93 months for growth cycles; 28-117 months for busi-
ness cycles. The results for other countries are similar; for example, the
ranges of growth cycles in Japan, the United Kingdom, France, and West
Germany are 40-99, 42-94, 41-70, and 41-98 months.
It is important to recognize that growth cycles are more difficult to identify
than business cycles and are not as well defined and measured. In recent
years, it was often taken for granted that trends and cycles have different
causes and effects. They used to be treated as independent, for example, the
long trend in real GNP as a deterministic function of time and the cycle as a
stationary second-order autoregressive process around that time trend (Kyd-
land and Prescott 1980; Blanchard 1981). This is now being strongly chal-
lenged by the view that the trends are themselves stochastic, and total output
as well as other important macroeconomic series are stationary only after dif-
ferencing (Nelson and Plosser 1982).
In an instructive article, Harvey (1985) argues in favor of a structured ap-
proach to modeling time series as containing unobserved stochastic trend and
cycle components. He finds the properties of annual series on output, unem-
ployment, consumer prices, and stock prices to be very different for periods
ending in 1947 (with starting dates from 1860 to 1909) and the period 1948-




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.245 The Regularity of Business Cycles
a separate component that can just be added on afterwards." For 1948-70 "a
faint cycle can be detected ... [but a] stochastic trend model is sufficient,"
whereas "after 1970 . . . it could be argued that the reintroduction of a cycli-
cal component is desirable" (p. 225). Not surprisingly, the short cycles ofthe
early postwar period appear only faintly when annual units are used. The dis-
pute continues but there is increasing evidence that the permanent components
in business cycles are much larger than was previously assumed (Campbell
and Mankiw 1987a, 1987b). All this may be interpreted as a revival ofcertain
time-honored ideas: that trends are not very stable over long periods of time
but subject to intermittent or sequential changes; that trends and cycles inter-
act in various ways; and that, therefore, the separation of trends and cycles
may be associated with serious errors (see ch. 7 for further discussion ofthis
topic and references).
8.2.5 How Regular Are Investment Cycles?
What evidence is there that inventory investment is a source ofminor cycles
and fixed investment a source ofmajor cycles? Studies ofthe historical record
indicate that the relative importance ofchanges in business inventories is very
large in short and weak fluctuations and much smaller in the long and strong
ones, whereas the opposite is typically the case for investment in plant and
equipment. Stocks ofgoods held for current production and sale are generally
subject to prompter and less costly adjustments than stocks of structures and
equipment on hand. Indeed, inventory investment is visibly more volatile than
investment in plant and equipment. It is likely to drop in any recession, mild
or severe, but will also at times show declines ofsome persistence during long
business expansions. Fixed-capital investment has fewer "extra" movements
of this kind. Yet comprehensive series on real investment of all types have a
high degree ofcyclical conformity; that is, they tend to move in broad swings
whose duration and timing match well the business cycles as dated by NBER.
Ifthere are any systematic differences in periodicities here, they appear not to
be sharp enough to be demonstrable by simple methods of comparing "spe-
cific cycles" in individual time series with "reference cycles" in aggregate
economic activity.
The techniques of spectral analysis are well designed to serve the purposes
of detecting and examining cyclical patterns or periodicities in large samples
of data on stationary processes. They have been successfully used as such in
the natural sciences and engineering. In econometric applications their useful-
ness is often limited by the small size of available samples of consistent data
and the prevalence ofnonstationary processes.
Most economic aggregates contain strong upward trends. Their short-
period changes are highly autocorrelated and small relative to their contem-
poraneous levels. The power spectra estimated for such series show sharp
peaks at the lowest, steep declines at rising, and flat declines at the highest246 Chapter Eight
frequencies. 5 Such convex curves relating power inversely to frequency
(hence positively to the cycle period) were found to be relatively smooth,
except for peaks at seasonal frequencies, and have been labeled "'the typical
spectral shape" (Granger 1966). In a spectrum so dominated by the long
movement of the series, cyclical features turned out to be very diluted and
difficult to identify. But this was soon recognized as a technical problem, not
a proof of the unimportance of business cycles in general. For series that are
trendless or detrended, more interesting spectra can be estimated. Differenc-
ing is often recommended and used. Howrey (1972) calculates spectra for real
GNP and its major expenditure components in both first-difference and linear-
detrended form. He finds using the change series preferable, but the results
are generally consistent. His conclusion is that "these estimates indicate, from
a descriptive point of vie'N, the reality of three- to five-year business cycles,
particularly in the investment series" (p. 617). The relative peaks that emerge
lack statistical significance according to conventional tests, but this result is
attributed to the shortness ofthe time series used. 6
Another large problem in empirical applications of the analysis relates to
the degree of smoothing used to produce the spectral density estimates. For
very long consistent time series that may contain a large number of cycles,
smoothing with weighted moving averages with many constants (a "trunca-
tion point" equal to one fourth or one third of the sample size, for example)
can be appropriate. For the short series (small samples) usually available in
economics, such smoothing may be too heavy. Hillinger (1986) contends that
it results in attenuation of spectral peaks at business cycle frequency bands as
in the "typical" spectral shapes. He presents unsmoothed spectra for quarterly
series for 1960-84, which show pronounced peaks only at business cycle
periods (roughly in the ranges of 3.5-8 and 3.5-10 years for West Germany
and the United States, respectively). But the unsmoothed spectra, like the
closely related periodograms, have unsatisfactory properties oftheir own and,
in particular, lack consistency.
7
Figures 8.1-8.4 and table 8.4 present the results ofan exploratory applica-
tion of spectral analysis to quarterly seasonally adjusted series on investment
in inventories, equipment, nonresidential structures, and housing for the
5. This would be so whether the trends are deterministic or stochastic, and whether the under-
lying time-series models are of the ARIMA class or AR( 1) with coefficients close to 1. For a
discussion ofthe broad range of interpretations ofspectra with this shape, see Granger and New-
bold 1977, pp. 53-55, 63-65.
6. See Howrey, 1972, p. 624, where references to Adelman 1965 and Howrey 1968 are used to
argue that studies of longer series "indicate more strikingly the relative importance of business-
cycle variation."
7. That is, the variance ofthe estimate does not tend to zero as the sample size tends to infinity.
Also, the covariance between estimates at different frequencies decreases steadily with the sample
size, so that for long series the risk offinding spurious periodicities is high. But these are strong
reasons to use high degrees ofsmoothing for large samples (increasing relative to the sample size);
they are not good arguments for applying long moving averages to spectra ofvery short series that










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































t249 The Regularity of Business Cycles
Table 8.4 Peaks in Unsmoothed and Smoothed Spectra for Quarterly Series of
Investment in Equipment, Nonresidential Structures, Inventories, and




Line (degree of smoothness) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Change in Business Inventories
ll
1 Unsmoothed (SO) 18 27 34 68 (19) 30 46 65
2 Two lags (S3) 18 25 (34) (55) (19) 30 46 65
3 Four lags (S7) 19 (27) (19) 30 (65)
Producers' Durable Equipmentf
4 Unsmoothed (SO) 9 (21) 34 68 17 27 51 65
5 Two lags (S3) 9 (21) 34 68 17 28 (51) (65)
6 Four lags (S7) 9 (21) (68) 17 28 (57)
Nonresidential Structuresf
7 Unsmoothed (SO) 8 21 46 68 9 28 51 76
8 Two lags (S3) 8 21 (55) 9 28 51 76
9 Four lags (S7) 8 21 (9) 30 51
Residential Fixed Investment'
10 Unsmoothed (SO) 8 23 34 68 (9) 28 51 91
11 Two lags (S3) 8 23 (34) (9) 28 51
12 Four lags (S7) 8 23 (9) 28 57
Sources: 1919-41, Gordon and Veitch 1986 (updated version ofdata in Balke and Gordon 1986). 1948-
86, Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Department of Commerce, national income and product ac-
counts.
aSee figs. 8.1-8.4 for plots of these spectra and their peaks.
bEntries in parentheses refer to low or flat peaks.
cEstimates based on data in 1972 dollars.
"Estimates based on data in 1982 dollars.
eInventory investment component ofreal GNP, used as reported.
{Change in the logarithms of the series (quarterly log differences).
United States, 1919-41 and 1948-86. Unsmoothed and lightly smoothed (3-
lag and 7-lag) spectra are examined.8 The post-World War II data come from
the national income and product accounts compiled by the U.S. Department
of Commerce, and the prewar data are new estimates by Gordon and Veitch
(1986), all in constant dollars. The series on change in business inventories
required no transformation; the other series, which show approximately log-
linear trends, are cast in the form of relative rates ofchange (specifically, log
differences).
The inventory series for 1948-86 show well-articulated peaks at periods of
8. The spectral windows were obtained with simple triangular weighting: 12 1for the 3-lag and
12343 2 1for the 7-lag smoothed spectra. The SAS/ETS SPECTRA procedure was used in the
calculations (see SASIETS User's Guide, 5th ed. [Cary, N.C.: SAS Institute, 1984], ch. 18).250 Chapter Eight
30,46, and 65 months in both the unsmoothed (SO) and 3-lag (S3) spectra. In
the 7-lag (S7) spectrum, there is also a peak at 2.5 years and a gently rising
plateau between 4 and 5.5 years. The prewar SO has peaks at 18,27,34, and
68 months; S3 matches the first three of these well and the next one poorly;
S7 is relatively high between 1.5-2 years only (cf. figs. 8.IA and 8.IB and
table 8.4, lines 1-3). The strong procyclical movements of inventory invest-
ment in both the prewar and the postwar years is well documented (for a recent
study of the 1929-83 period, see Blinder and Holtz-Eakin 1986). Measure-
ment errors in the inventory investment data for the pre-1929 period may be
responsible for the relative weakness of business cycle indications in the
smoothed spectra for 1919-41.9
The 1948-86 spectra for producers' durable equipment show relative peaks
at frequencies very similar to those located in the corresponding spectra for
inventory investment, and these peaks show up in the smoothed curves as
well, although much flattened. The 30- and 50-month peaks also appear, and
more strongly, in the postwar spectra for both nonresidential and residential
structures, but here there are some signs of much shorter and much longer
cycles as well (cf. figs. 8.2-8.4 and table 8.4).
In the 1919-41 period, the 68-month cycle peaks appear in the SO spectra
for all three categories of fixed investment as well as for the change in busi-
ness inventories but disappear or show up but weakly in the smoothed curves.
The same is true ofthe 34-month peaks, except for nonresidential structures,
where this cycle seems to be at least 1year longer. The fixed-investment spec-
tra also suggest some very short (9-month) and short (about 2-year) cycles.
In view ofthe unresolved problems and doubts noted earlier in this section,
it seems best to treat these results simply as provisional without trying to test
them in any formal way. Yet they are suggestive. The spectral peaks in table
8.4, col. 7, correspond to periods of46, 51, and 57 months, all very close to
the average durations ofbusiness cycles before and after World War II (53-56
months, see table 8.2, lines 2 and 3). The longest cycles, represented by rel-
ative peaks near 5.5-6.5 years (table 8.4, cols. 4 and 8), also fit in well with
the observed durations ofmajor macroeconomic fluctuations since 1919. This
is not the case for those spectral peaks of inventory investment that corre-
spond to periods of 1.5-2.5 years, which are shorter even than the average
growth cycles of about 3.5 years (cf. table 8.4, lines 1-3, and table 8.3, line
1). But these results are at least in rough accord with the general notion that
inventory investment generates short fluctuations, and indeed graphs ofother
9. See Gordon and Veitch 1986, app. pp. 328-35, for a description of the data. Since their
estimates of inventory investment were derived as residuals, they may have larger errors than the
other series, especially for the early years covered. The Chow-Lin 1971 interpolation method was
used to convert the annual series to quarterly observations. For producers' durable equipment,
industrial production of producers' goods served as the basis for the interpolation; for plant and
housing, industrial and residential building contracts and construction indexes were similarly em-
ployed.251 The Regularity of Business Cycles
spectrum estimates show similar local maxima (Howrey 1972; Hillinger
1986).
The observation that seems most difficult to explain is the apparent promi-
nence of very short fluctuations in all divisions of fixed investment. More
generally, the limitations of analyses and evidence of this type need to be
stressed. Too many periodicities emerge in unsmoothed spectra; too few sur-
vive even relatively light smoothing. Aggregation across these and other com-
ponents would be expected to produce much weaker and probably less peri-
odic fluctuations in total output and employment.
8.3 Models and Problems
8.3.1 Limit Cycles and Random and Exogenous Shocks
Certain theories can produce strictly periodic fluctuations: a classic ex-
ample is the nonlinear model of a limit cycle bounded between exogenously
given "floor" and "ceiling" growth trajectories. 10 In the deterministic case, if
the parameters ofthis model were to remain constant, the cycles would repeat
themselves perfectly. This, of course, is not the observed or expected out-
come, so random shocks must be added to nonlinear models too, but they play
a relatively small role in systems with limit cycles. Major departures from
periodicity may require changes over time in the basic parameters of models
in this class. Such changes are indeed likely in a world with structural change
and occasional large disturbances (e.g., wars). They are contemplated in dis-
cussions of some of these models but are not incorporated in the models or
otherwise explained.
Random disturbances do have an essential part in the dynamically stable
(i.e., damped) linear models, which, unless repeatedly shocked, cannot pro-
duce a continuing cycle. The output of such damped systems is represented
10. In Hicks 1950 the floor and ceiling lines have identical slopes equal to the long trend growth
rate. The floor is set by the minimum rate ofgross investment, which includes an autonomous part
and maintenance of the current stock of capital; the ceiling is set by the limits on the resources
available at full employment. Net investment is in large part induced by lagged changes in output,
with a high value for the accelerator coefficient. Interacting with the lagged consumption-income
(multiplier) relation, this accelerator would, in the unconstrained case, cause output to grow ex-
ponentially. But once set in motion by some initial impulse, an expansion will be slowed upon
reaching the ceiling, and in the resulting downswing the accelerator is suspended until positive
growth is again resumed when output falls to the floor and starts moving up along it.
It is important to note that the model could be relaxed in several ways to allow for differentiation
ofthe endogenous and self-perpetuating cycles that it produces. (1) The accelerator could be such
as to correspond to a cyclically explosive, rather than a monotonically explosive, solution. (2)
Investment that is Hautonomous"-that is, caused by factors other than the change in output-
may fluctuate, say for technological or financial reasons. (3) Weak cycles may occur in which the
ceiling is not reached. (4) Some variations may be admitted in the rate of growth of full-
employment output and in the sizes and lag patterns of the accelerator and multiplier. See Hicks
1950, ch. 9.252 Chapter Eight
by a second-order linear difference equation with a white-noise term u, that
is, y==aY_I-bY_2+U, with complex roots and b < 1 in absolute value
(also, a
2 < 4b). When b is very close to unity, there is little damping and the
periodicity is relatively high and easy to recognize; when b is lower (say, near
0.8), damping is strong and periodicity is weak and no longer visible. (For a
demonstration of these relations by means of long-run stochastic computer
simulations, see Britton 1986, pp. 7-9.)
It is only the small white-noise shocks densely distributed through time that
serve as a possible source of periodicity in the damped linear models. Large
specific shocks that are discontinuous and sporadic are likely to make business
cycles and their phases less, rather than more, regular. Such disturbances can
be caused by wars, large strikes and bankruptcies, price bubbles, foreign debt
and financial crises, price cartel actions, and major shifts in fiscal and mone-
tary policies. They will be particularly important when autocorrelated, which
they probably often are. The conclusion ofBlanchard and Watson (1986) that
business cycles are affected by both small and large shocks but dominated by
neither (and hence not "all alike") is plausible but as yet not well established.
As illustrated in chapter 9, simulations of large econometric models show
them to possess weak cyclicality properties, to which relatively little is con-
tributed by random noise. Serially correlated error terms in the model equa-
tions and exogenous variables have stronger effects, but generally the macro-
econometric models are heavily damped and fail to account for much of the
cyclical instability observed in past and recent data (Hickman 1972; Eckstein
and Sinai 1986).
8.3.2 Government and the Business Cycle
The political business cycle (PBC) is a simple idea suggestive of periodic-
ity: government policies aimed at winning elections for the party in power
manage to manipulate inflation and unemployment so as to generate inverse
cycles in the two variables, with turning points associated with the electoral
campaigns and voting dates. Where the latter are fixed, as in the case ofthe 4-
year presidential cycle in the United States, the so-induced fluctuations should
have a strong tendency to be periodic. This hypothesis led to a considerable
amount of interesting work on popularity functions relating electoral results
to macroeconomic variables and reaction functions relating instruments to po-
tential targets ofeconomic policies. But the results vary and on the whole fail
to be clearly supportive of the PBC models. This is not surprising, because it
is doubtful that the contemplated policies can be sufficiently well timed and
executed and, also, that the public will continually accept, or be fooled by,
such policies ifthey succeed and tolerate them ifthey fail.
Business cycles go back a long time during the era ofrelatively small gov-
ernments of limited economic functions and influence; but they have changed
in various ways since, reflecting the evolution ofthe modern economy in both
its private and public aspects (R. 1. Gordon 1986). It is certainly important to253 The Regularity of Business Cycles
study these changes and the role ofgovernment transactions, institutions, and
policies in contemporary macroeconomic dynamics. But increasingly it is rec-
ognized that the most promising way to proceed in this direction is by treating
the government as part of the endogenous process generating the economy's
movement. Government policymakers as well as private agents react to actual
and expected economic developments in pursuit of their objectives, despite
the important (though partial) differences in the motivations, nature, and ef-
fects of their actions. There is both conflict and cooperation in the resulting
process, with elements of complex games among the major partners, notably
central banks and treasuries on one side and financial markets, business asso-
ciations, and labor unions on the other.
Much hard work will have to be done to improve our understanding ofthese
interactions, but some aspects of the story can be captured by extensions of
current textbook models ofthe relations between output and interest rates (IS-
LM) and output and prices (AD-AS). Fiscal and monetary policies affect IS
and LM, respectively, and hence aggregate demand (AD); they also respond
to shifts in IS, LM, AD, and aggregate supply (AS) that are caused by forces
outside the government. What is needed is (1) to make the system dynamic by
introducing lags and/or nonlinearities and (2) to make the policy variables
endogenous by specifying how they react to changes in economic conditions.
(However, this does not, in principle, preclude allowing for autonomous and
stochastic elements in government actions, which are probably often substan-
tial.)
The simplest approach is to use lags in the determination of prices (P) as
well as output (Q), which may be due to slow and uncertain information, costs
of rapid adjustments, desired implicit or explicit contract arrangements, or
deviations from perfect competition. If then AD shifts up so that Qexceeds
its full-employment level (QN) at the existing level ofprices, there will occur
a gradual upward adjustment in P and eventually also in expected prices (pe).
This will cause wages and other costs to rise and hence AS to move up, so
that over time Qwill fall back to QN. IfAD shifts down and Qdeclines below
QN, lagged downward adjustments ofP and pe will follow, so AS will move
down and Q will slowly rise back to QN. The driving force here is the variation
in demand; supply adjusts at prices and wages that are predetermined and slow
to change, which explains the long lags involved. I I
The fluctuations in AD could be the work solely ofreal forces in the private
economy, as in the accelerator-multiplier interaction models, or solely of
changes in money supply dominated by central-bank actions, as in a simple
11. In the presence of a long-term upward trend in P, this model would focus on the relation
between QIQN and the actual and expected inflation rates (p and pe). When QIQN> 1, inflation
would accelerate (i.e., p and pe would increase); when QIQN < 1, p and pe tend to decline. An-
other modification of the model is that some authors dispense with the concept of a short-run
upward-sloping AS curve, keep the vertical AS curve at full employment, and work directly with
shifts in the horizontal predetermined price levels. (Examples ofthese different treatments can be
found today in most ofthe popular macroeconomic texts.)254 Chapter Eight
exogenous monetarist model. An early formal model that combines real and
monetary factors within a private economy is Hicks 1950 (chs. 11 and 12),
where an IS-LM cobweb-type cycle is superimposed upon the nonlinear-
accelerator core part of the system. This monetary cobweb results from the
joint operation of long distributed lags in consumption and investment and
shorter discrete lags in the demand for and supply of"bank money." This is an
endogenous theory of a "monetary crisis" leading to a sharp rise in liquidity
preference (a "credit crunch" in the more recent parlance).
Early students of business cycles saw no particular reason to give much
attention to government activities. Keynesians have long treated the govern-
ment as exogenous and having a large potential for reducing instability by
countercyclical fiscal policies, income transfers and subsidies, or insurance
schemes that keep up the volume ofautonomous spending. The idea that gov-
ernment actions may be strongly destabilizing is still more recent, being due
mainly to the rise of monetarism and its emphasis on the exogeneity and im-
portance ofmonetary policy.
In the currently prevalent linear stochastic models, fiscal and monetary op-
erations can produce either destabilizing shocks or stabilizing interventions,
depending on how well they are timed, quantified, and executed. Some ac-
tions are taken to correct previous actions newly discovered to have been in
error. So this approach permits a comprehensive treatment of policies and
related variables, which can be revealing-ifnot pushed too hard.
Consider a monetary acceleration intended to reviv~ a sluggish economy
that has a cumulative lagged effect of fanning a business expansion into an
inflationary boom, whereupon restrictive measures are taken that shift AD
back and replace excess demand with excess supply. The concept of a cycle
driven by such policy errors was popularized by the persistent monetarist crit-
icism of the Federal Reserve, whose discretionary policies were time and
again described as doing "too much too late." But it is hard to see how this
argument can be generalized, and there is no sufficient evidence to support an
attempt to do so. It would indeed be strange for such failures not to give rise
to caution and learning but rather to be recurring with much the same negative
results. Government miscalculations may well be common, but they do not
offer a good basis for explaining the long existence and wide diffusion of
business cycles. 12
8.3.3 Nonlinearities
In linear models, time lags that cause overshooting in adjustments to equi-
librium are essential to produce fluctuations in response to shocks. Nonlinear
12. In her (unpublished) comments on this chapter, Anna Schwartz has suggested that actions
of monetary authorities may be endogenous in relation to minor cycles but not major cycles.
Hence the absence ofdeep depressions in the post-World War II period could reflect caution and
learning by the authorities. I agree that this may indeed be a partial reason for the postwar moder-
ation ofthe business cycle (see ch. 2).255 The Regularity of Business Cycles
models can explain endogenously the existence and amplitude ofa limit cycle
without any shocks and explicit lags. (This is shown by a long line of work,
from Kaldor 1940 and Goodwin 1951 on nonlinear investment-saving pro-
cesses and cyclical profit shares to Schinasi 1982 on the integration of such
functions and an IS-LM model with a government budget constraint.) But
limit-cycle models need shocks to diversify the cycles and lags to determine
their periods. And after all, it stands to reason that a successful explanation of
how the "real world" economies move will have to include all these ele-
ments-random or exogenous disturbances and delayed reactions as well as
nonlinearities.
Technical and scientific advances are facilitating work with reasonably
comprehensive yet comprehensible models. Empirically, much is known
about the role of leads and lags in business cycles. The part played by shocks
is not so well understood and is more controversial despite (or perhaps be-
cause of) the current predominance of linear models that rely heavily on out-
side impulses of all sorts. The neglect of nonlinearities may well have led to
an overstatement of the importance of random factors and perhaps also of
policy changes treated as exogenous.
Nonlinear models now cover a wide range ofbusiness cycle theories: much
of the work has Keynesian and some has Marxian flavor, but classical and
neoclassical ideas are also represented (see the essays in Goodwin, Kruger,
and Vercelli 1984 and in Semmler 1985). Grandmont (1985) shows that per-
sistent deterministic fluctuations will emerge in an overlapping-generations
(OLG) model in which markets clear and perfect foresight is obtained along
the transition path through a sequence of periodic competitive equilibria. The
basic condition is simply that the older agents have a greater preference for
leisure. With the specified lag structure, cycles ofdifferent periods will typi-
cally coexist. The model has classical properties and generates some observed
comovements, but it also suggests the possibility ofan effective countercycli-
cal monetary policy. 13
Introduction of nonlinearities is necessary for modeling and analyses of a
variety of theoretical ideas such as (1) time irreversibilities or ratchet effects
employed in some early models ofconsumption and cyclical growth (Duesen-
berry 1949; Smithies 1957; Minsky 1959) and (2) discontinuities or jumps at
certain parameter values that can differentiate the length of cycle phases or
impose irregular fluctuations on long-term growth (from Goodwin 1951 to
13. Compare related results on other applications of the OLG approach that yield multiple
rational-expectations solutions (ch. 2, sec. 4.6 gives a brief summary). Grandmont's system has
the classical dichotomy: equilibrium prices are proportional to the stock of money, whereas the
real variables are determined in the goods market. Prices are positively correlated with output,
and real interest rates are inversely correlated with output.
In contrast, a nonlinear model ofcapital accumulation in Foley 1986 shows how monetary and
fiscal policies can fail to reduce cyclical instability and may even increase it. Here the accelerator
amplifies the cycle, but liquidity effects eventually constrain it.256 Chapter Eight
Day 1982, for example). 14 For these and other good reasons, this field of
study is a promising and active one; but the work done so far is lopsidedly
devoted to manipulations of highly aggregative and abstract models. What is
badly needed is the development of tested knowledge of where the nonlinear-
ities in the economy are located, how important they are, and what effects
they have. This will require much careful examination of existing, and per-
haps also collection ofnew, empirical data.
8.3.4 Asymmetries
An important point that did receive some attention recently is the possibility
ofbasically asymmetrical cyclical behavior manifested in contractions that are
on the average shorter and steeper than expansions. The view that such an
asymmetry exists is far from new; as shown below, it found support in long
historical evidence and was endorsed by some prominent economists several
decades ago. But linear techniques are not capable ofrepresenting or explain-
ing this type ofbehavior.
Mitchell (1927, pp. 330-34) noted that frequency distributions of month-
to-month changes in trend-adjusted indexes of business activity for periods
between 1875 and 1925 are slightly skewed to the left in each case. He wrote
that "abrupt declines usually occur in crises; the greatest gains... come...
as reactions after sudden drops"; also, "the number ofdeclines is smaller than
the number ofadvances, but the average magnitude ofthe declines is greater."
He concluded that "business contraction seems to be a briefer and more vio-
lent process that business expansion."
Keynes appears to have narrowed the asymmetry from the total phases of
rise and fall to the peak and trough zones. He wrote of "the phenomenon of
the crisis-the fact that the substitution of a downward for an upward ten-
dency often takes place suddenly and violently, whereas there is, as a rule, no
such sharp turning-point when an upward is substituted for a downward ten-
dency" (1936, p. 314).15
Table 8.5 shows average amplitude values (i.e., rates of change or slopes)
for cyclical upswings and downswings in several long historical series with
adjustments for secular trends. The measures are reproduced from Mitchell
1927 and Burns and Mitchell 1946 (or based on the data given therein; see
notes to the table). For Mitchell's series in trend-adjusted form, the number of
month-to-month increases tends to exceed that of declines only slightly (col.
2), whereas the absolute size of increases tends to be smaller than that of
declines by varying differentials (coIs. 3 and 4). The deposits series provides
14. The variety ofslopes and shapes ofthe partly smooth, partly oscillating growth trajectories
produced by recently developed purely deterministic models is remarkable (see Day 1982, fig. 1,
p. 407), but it must be noted that these movements are much less persistent and more "chaotic"
than those observed in economic aggregates during business cycles.
15. Hicks held a similar view ofthe asymmetry but less strongly. He related it to the "monetary
deflation" that may accompany the real downturn and make it more severe (1950, pp. 115-18,
106-62). Keynes explained the "crisis" mainly by "a sudden collapse in the marginal efficiency
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Table 8.5 Average Rates ofRise and Fall in Indexes ofBusiness Activity, Unadjusted




Cyclesa Expandingb Rise Fall Rise Fall
Unadjusted
Trend-Adjusted Datad Data
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Deflated clearings (Snyder)
1875-1923 (M) 12 52 2.0 2.2
1884-1933 (B-M) 13 0.6 1.9 0.8 2.0
Clearings index (Frickey)
1875-1914 (M) 10 51 4.0 4.2
1884-1914 (B-M) 9 0.7 1.6 1.0 1.8
AT&T index
1877-1925 (M) 13 52 2.5 2.7
1900--1933 (B-M) 9 1.1 1.8 1.3 1.9
Deposits index (Snyder)
1875-1923 (M) 13 47 3.0 2.8
Trade index (Persons)
1903-1924 (M) 6 53 2.8 3.3
Pig iron production
1897-1933 (B-M) 15 2.5 4.0 2.4 4.7
Railroad bond fields (Macaulay)
1860--1931 (B-M) 16 0.62 0.65 0.56 0.94
Sources: (M) Mitchell 1927, tabulation on p. 333 and text, pp. 326-34. (B-M) Bums and Mitchell 1946,
table 97, p. 291, and text, pp. 280-94.
aNumber ofcomplete specific cycles covered (trough-to-trough or peak-to-peak, whichever is larger). In
(B-M) only corresponding cycles that show up in both unadjusted and trend-adjusted data are included
(see n. e).
bNumber of rises plus half the number of no change expressed as percentage of all month-to-month
changes covered (calculated from data in Mitchell 1927, p. 333).
eBased on relative deviations from trend ordinates (M) or specific-cycle relatives (B-M).
tl'frends calculated by original sources as smooth functions of time (oscillatory for bond yields, upward
for the other series).
eCycles in 1864-58, 1899-1905, and 1909-14 are omitted as noncorresponding.
the only exception here. The measures of Burns and Mitchell show the
downswings as being on the average steeper (more rapid) than the upswings
in every case. The differences are relatively large for both the unadjusted and
the trend-adjusted series, except for railroad bond yields, where the trend is
oscillatory (indeed downward most ofthe time; see Burns and Mitchell 1946,
chart 36, p. 275).16
16. Forelectricity output in 1921-33, a strongly growing series, the rise and fall amplitudes are
1.0 and 0.8 in the unadjusted data and 0.5 and 0.7 in trend-adjusted data, respectively. This is an
example of an asymmetry that is concealed by the trend in the original series, but it is based on
two corresponding series only (Blatt 1983, p. 231).258 Chapter Eight
Blatt finds the results reported by Bums and Mitchell for the detrended
series to be very significant economically and statistically and infers that "a
pronounced lack ofsymmetry is the rule" (1980; 1983, p. 232). He views this
as a strong contradiction of the Frisch-type random shock theory of business
cycles, which implies symmetrical fluctuations around trend.
De Long and Summers (1986) estimate coefficients of skewness in quar-
terly growth rates ofreal GNP and industrial production from post-World War
II data for the six major OECD countries. The asymmetry hypothesis implies
negative skewness. The estimates have negative signs in 9 out of 12 cases, but
they are generally small relative to the calculated standard errors. For the
United States, annual data show more evidence of negative skewness than
quarterly data, particularly for GNP in the postwar period. Surprisingly, the
skewness is positive (but not significant) for the U.S. quarterly real GNP se-
ries in 1891-1915 and 1923-40. The authors conclude (p. 176) that "it is
reasonable in a first approximation to model business cycles as symmetric
oscillations about a rising trend" since "GNP growth rates and industrial pro-
duction growth rates do not provide significant evidence ofasymmetry."
It would seem that this inference is too strong and probably premature,
being based on uncertain assumptions and evidence. The standard errors of
skewness are estimated from Monte Carlo simulations that assume the growth
rates to be stationary third-order autoregression processes. The reasoning of
Mitchell, Keynes, and Hicks attributes the asymmetry largely to the occur-
rence of sharp downturns in investment and/or monetary stringencies and fi-
nancial crises. This is a plausible hypothesis, but it leads us to expect more
asymmetry in the earlier era than after World War II; however, the De Long-
Summers results unaccountably show the opposite. The GNP data inevitably
are much less reliable for the former period. The Mitchell and Bums series
used in table 8.5, though limited and partly overlapping in coverage, provide
more observations and may well be on firmer ground. The evidence based on
them is also less general and conclusive than it was interpreted to be, but it
certainly should not be ignored or dismissed.
Neft~i (1984) rejects the null hypothesis ofsymmetry for unemployment in
the United States in 1948-81 on the strength of tests applied only to data on
the direction (not size) of changes in several series ofjobless rates. De Long
and Summers are critical of such tests for sacrificing power, but their own
results confirm those of Neft~i even more strongly: quarterly U.S. data show
positive skewness in unemployment and negative skewness in employment,
both significant at the 5% level. However, they find no evidence of asymme-
tries in quarterly unemployment series for the five other OECD countries in
1950-79. This last result, though, relies heavily on difficult trend adjustments
for large rises in European unemployment after 1973 assumed to be noncycl-
ical; if not so detrended these series would appear strongly skewed. There is
much that is unexplained and uncertain about these findings. 17
17. When detrended and plotted to appropriate scales, the unemployment rate and (inverted)
industrial production show closely similar fluctuations (see chart in De Long and Summers 1986,259 The Regularity of Business Cycles
It is true that the appearance of strong asymmetries in unadjusted time se-
ries is due to a large extent to the prevailing secular growth, and so is the fact
that business expansions are much longer than contractions, as noted by De
Long and Summers. But even series that contain no upward trends or from
which such trends have been eliminated as well as possible often show visibly
asymmetric behavior of the envisaged type. If no asymmetries occurred, the
upswing and downswing phases of growth cycles should be about equal in
length on the average over time. But table 8.3 shows that high-growth phases
were typically longer than low-growth phases (cf. cols. 3 and 5).
Table 8.6 lists the differences between the average durations ofhigh-growth
and low-growth phases: they are all positive (col. 1). For the United States,
Canada, and the United Kingdom, they are small (1-3 months); for West Ger-
many, the difference is near zero. For the other six countries, they are much
larger (9-17 months) and statistically significant at 2.5%-15% levels; the
strongest evidence that high-growth phases tend to be longer comes from the
measures for Japan, Australia, and the Netherlands (ools. 2-4).
Other indications that nonlinearities are neglected or concealed by currently
popular methods of econometric and time-series analysis are scattered in re-
cent literature (Blatt 1978; Britton 1986, pp. 50-52; Neft~i 1986). The con-
clusions range all the way from saying that these methods are very deficient
(Blatt) to saying that they are the best available and unscathed by a search for
asymmetries (De Long and Summers). Actually the search has so far been
short and weak. The evidence is not very strong but on balance it suggests
that business cycles do have potentially important nonlinear characteristics.
Further research on this front is certainly needed.
8.3.5 Do Expansions Die ofOld Age?
Late in 1985 many observers greeted the third anniversary ofthe continuing
business expansion with a touch of worry. As measured by NBER, only 1 of
the 6 peacetime expansions since 1945 lasted more than 39 months. Ofthe 14
comparable phases in 1854-1919, none survived more than 3 years, and of
the 5 in 1919-45, only 1 did. Late in 1986 the same reasoning led to even
stronger fears ofa downturn. But by mid-1987 the expansion was nearing the
peacetime record set recently in 1975-79 (58 months), and few forecasters
expected a recession in the near future; and by early 1990 the new record
exceeded the old one by more than 2 years. Far from being self-evident, the
popular expectation that as an expansion grows older, the probability of its
terminating increases should be viewed as a hypothesis open to much doubt
and in need offull examination.
Ifbusiness fluctuations were just random walks, then their past would have
p. 175). The timing differences between the two are partly systematic but small. Charts for other
countries display much the same cyclical patterns in the corresponding series (Klein and Moore
1985, ch. 4 and app. 4A and 4B.) The test results may overstate the differences in skewness
between output and employment.260 Chapter Eight
Table 8.6 Differences in Average Durations ofHigh-Growth and Low-Growth Phases
for 10 Countries, 1948-1983
Difference Degrees Standard
Country HG minus of Error
and Period LGa (mo.) Freedomb (SAY t-Statisticd
Covered (1) (2) (3) (4)
1. United States, 1948-82 1.3 17 4.94 0.26
2. Canada, 1950-82 2.0 18 3.74 0.54
3. Japan, 1953-83 17.2 10 7.14 2.41 e
4. Australia, 1951-83 8.7 13 4.86 1.791
5. United Kingdom, 1951-83 2.9 11 6.19 0.47
6. West Gennany, 1951-83 0.2 11 6.63 0.03
7. France, 1957-79 13.2 8 8.76 1.51 g
8. Italy, 1956-80 11.2 8 8.97 1.25h
9. Netherlands, 1950-79 11.2 12 5.59 2.0IJ
10. Switzerland, 1950-75 16.8 8 11.96 1.40g
Source: Table 8.3.
aHG = average duration of high-growth phases; LG = average duration oflow-growth phases.
bEquals N I + Nz - 2, where N I = number ofHG phases and Nz = number ofLG phases.
(N( - l)sf + (Nz - l)s~ I/Z N
I + Nz
I/Z
cSA = [ ] (---) ,where sf and S~ are variances of HG and LG phases,
N I + Nz - 2 NI Nz
respectively.
dEntry in col. 1 divided by entry in col. 3.
eSignificant at the 2.5% level.
fSignificant at the 5% level.
gSignificant at the 10% level.
hSignificant at the 15% level.
no predictive value, and in particular the probability ofa peak (trough) in any
month ofan ongoing expansion (contraction) would be a constant independent
ofthe age ofthe phase. Indeed, McCulloch (1975) presents tests showing that
the probability oftermination is equal for "young" and "old" expansions, once
the movement has exceeded some minimum duration, and that the same ap-
plies to contractions. This suggests to him that business fluctuations are
merely like the "Monte Carlo cycles" the superstitious gamblers misperceive
in their luck at casinos or racetracks, that is, pseudocycles with "no periodic-
ity, rhythm, or pattern except perhaps a trend" (p. 303).
On the other hand, Neft<;i (1982) offers a formula for an "optimal" predic-
tion of cyclical downturns, one component of which is the probability of a
peak this month based just on the length ofthe expansion to date. (The other
is the probability of observing this month's value of the percentage change in
the index ofleading indicators when the trend in that index is upward.) Neft<;i
estimates the probabilities by smoothing the distributions of the observed
phase durations and percentage changes in the leading index. Thus he expects
the duration ofan expansion in itselfto be ofsome help in predicting the peak261 The Regularity of Business Cycles
(mutatis mutandis, the same applies to contractions and troughs). A degree of
success is claimed for this approach, and some modifications improve it fur-
ther (Palash and Radecki 1985; de Leeuw, Missouri, and Robinson 1986; Nie-
mira 1991).
McCulloch's tests present some technical problems: it seems that small
changes in the underlying assumptions and data can lead to very different
conclusions (de Leeuw 1987). But even ifhis results were entirely acceptable,
his interpretation ofthem is not. Business cycles need not be strictly periodic
to differ radically from purely random movements. The many important reg-
ularities well documented in studies of domestic, foreign, and international
business fluctuations simply cannot be reconciled with the notion of "Monte
Carlo cycles." Business cycles are far too persistent and pervasive for that,
and they contain far too many common features with common explanations.
In both relatively short and long, small and large expansions and contractions,
some variables conform strongly, others weakly, some positively, others in-
versely. There are also systematic differences in cyclical amplitudes-and nu-
merous recurring timing sequences as some variables tend to lead and others
lag-at business cycle peaks and/or troughs.
Like the authors cited above, Hamilton (1989) models the business cycle as
an outcome of a Markov process that switches between two discrete states,
one representing expansions, the other contradictions. However, he assumes
that the state transition probabilities are independent of the phase durations.
This implies a constant hazard function ~(T) = ~ (where ~ is the probability
that a process will end after a duration, T, given'that it lasted until T) and a
memoryless exponential distribution of durations f(T) = ~e- AT (Kiefer 1988).
Diebold and Rudebusch (1990a), using NBER-designated business cycle
phases, find that the null hypothesis of no duration dependence is not contra-
dicted by the small sample of observations on postwar expansions. There is,
however, some evidence of duration dependence in prewar expansions, post-
war contractions, and, particularly, full cycles over the entire period covered
(1854-1982). These results imply a weak stochastic form of periodicity, that
is, a clustering tendency of intervals between successive peaks or troughs
(and, at times, between successive peaks andtroughs). They are entirely con-
sistent with the historical analysis provided earlier in this chapter.
Neft~i's and related exercises suggest that the potential contribution of the
phase duration measures and associated probabilities to the problem of fore-
casting business cycle turning points is likely to be modest, though probably
not zero, as hypothesized by McCulloch. It would indeed be surprising to find
otherwise. The probability ofa peak during an expansion orofa trough during
a contraction is clearly not just or even largely a function of the duration of
the phase. Various combinations of internal stresses and imbalances with ex-
ternal disturbances, including major policy errors, can cut the life of an eco-
nomic recovery short or bring on an unsustainable boom. Conversely, well-
chosen policies and other favorable developments can prolong an expansion262 Chapter Eight
by helping to keep a slowdown in the economy from sliding into an absolute
decline or a speedup from creating inflationary demand pressures. A recession
may in itself create the conditions for the next upturn, or the recovery may be
accelerated by stimulative policies.
What matters primarily, then, is not the passage of calendar time but what
happens over time in and to the economy in motion. It is historical and psy-
chological time, filled with events and processes, perceptions and actions.
This is, ofcourse, generally so in human affairs. There is a simple corollary:
knowledge of the current phase ofthe business cycle and its age can help but
must not be used in isolation. Its proper role is to assist in the interpretation of
the contemporaneous movements of the economy by enabling us to compare
systematically the present with the historical patterns ofthe indicators.
8.3.6 Predictability and Costs
Business cycle turning points, particularly peaks, tend to be associated with
unusually large forecasting errors (see ch. 13 and 14 below). If the durations
ofexpansions and contractions had been highly stable over extended periods,
forecasters (and indeed economically active and observant people in general)
should have long learned how to predict the timing ofthese phases with con-
siderable accuracy. The fact that economic downturns and to a lesser extent
upturns cause much surprise is therefore a strong prima facie argument against
the hypothesis that business cycles are periodic. Since major slowdowns and
recessions produce individual losses and social distress, there are surely major
incentives to improve the related forecasts and decisions. Moreover, in the
presence of continuing and recognizable periodicities, ways would presum-
ably be found to reduce cyclical instability or to adjust to it so that it did
relatively little harm to the economy at large.
Indeed, no grave and persistent economic and social problems are caused
by seasonal fluctuations despite their broad diffusion and large quantitative
importance. This is so because the seasonal cycles are generally close to being
periodic and predictable. Business people, workers, and consumers possess
much accumulated knowledge of how to cope with this type of anticipated
instability, and there exist various institutional and market arrangements to
help. True, seasonal variations have stochastic components that can be a
source of significant forecasting and decision errors, but these are properly
matters ofprivate concern. In contrast, recurrent slumps that generate declines
in sales, production, and incomes along with rises in unemployment clearly
belong to the sphere of public interest, and so do recurrent inflationary or
speculative booms.
It is certainly possible to conceive ofcauses ofhighly periodic, persistent,
and costly cycles in total output and employment. They would have to be
exogenous, inevitable, and themselves periodic. The classic case here is the
weather cycle, whether due to variations in sunspot intensity or other factors
(Jevons 1884; Moore 1914). But today such explanations lack all plausibility.263 The Regularity of Business Cycles
Moreover, such hypothetical externally imposed cycles would resemble sea-
sonal fluctuations much more than business cycles. 18
In short, the considerations ofpredictability and costs argue against the idea
that business cycles are strongly and stably periodic. The existence oflimited
and variable periodicities, however, cannot be excluded.
8.4 Summary and Conclusions
The historical chronologies of business cycles provide evidence that is on
the whole inconsistent with the hypothesis of strong overall periodicity, ac-
cording to which these fluctuations tend to be of constant length. True, over
long stretches of time similar average durations are obtained for the principal
economies (about 4 years in the United States, 5 years in Great Britain), and
most cycles fall within the ranges of ± 1 year around these means. But the
dispersion measures for all cycle durations are large in absolute and relative
terms everywhere. There is a sharp contrast in this respect between business
cycles and the almost strictly periodic seasonal fluctuations.
Nevertheless, examples ofapproximate periodicity limited in time exist and
deserve attention. Thus the 1958-82 turning-point comparisons, autocorrela-
tions, spectral analysis, and autoregressions for the United Kingdom all sup-
port the statement that the "appearance of the trade cycle . . . is unusually,
although not uniquely, periodic" (Britton 1986, p. 52). But a major (and fully
recognized) difficulty with these results is that 25 years of data is a slender
basis for determining cycles whose typical length may be 5 years. Yet over
longer periods the structure of the economy is likely to change in ways that
would alter the periodicity. ]9
Spectral analysis indicates a relative concentration of power around fre-
quencies corresponding to the average duration of business cycles (near 4.5
years). Since these techniques are applied to trendless or detrended series, the
average growth cycle duration (about 3.5 years) may be more relevant here,
and spectral peaks that approximate it are found as well. These estimates,
however, are of uncertain significance, and the approach also suggests other
periodicities, including some that are clearly outside the range of observed
nonseasonal fluctuations.
These observations suggest that business cycles defy simple characteriza-
tions, showing a strong tendency to recur and at times even near periodicity,
18. They would be longer and perhaps less regular than normal seasonal fluctuations, hence
their social costs should be higher. But it could hardly be beyond the individual and collective
ingenuity of people to find, in time, effective ways to reduce and allocate the burdens of such
anticipated instability.
19. In fact, Britton's results for earlier periods in the modem history of Great Britain and for
the United States since 1960 differ from his results for the United Kingdom in 1958-82, and the
differences depend greatly on methods of estimation. Unlike for the United Kingdom, the evi-
dence ofperiodicity for the United States (based on unemployment data) is found to be "relatively
weak and doubtful" (1986, p. 44; for detail see ibid., chs. 1and 4).264 Chapter Eight
along with great diversity and evolution of phase durations. It is difficult but
necessary to recognize such phenomena in the theoretical work on the subject.
Periodic business cycles are represented in the theoretical literature by a
variety of models. The nonlinear accelerator-multiplier interactions can pro-
duce a limit cycle. Where elections are periodic, a political business cycle
could conceivably have a parallel rhythm. These models have some rather
evident and serious problems, and it does not redound to their advantage that
they can generate periodicity that is more exact and general than consistent
with likelihood and observation. But this does not mean that nonlinearities
may safely be neglected; on the contrary, they are probably important and
their empirical identification is much needed. In particular, there are some
indications ofasymmetrical cyclical behavior. One set ofthese is provided by
historical trend-adjusted series whose downswings tend to be steeper than up-
swings. Another consists ofestimated durations ofgrowth cycle phases in the
post-World War II period: for most countries surveyed, the periods of above-
average growth tend to be longer than the periods ofbelow-average growth.
The variability in length of business expansions and contractions is suffi-
ciently large for the timing of cyclical turning points (particularly peaks) to
be, demonstrably, very difficult to forecast. The age ofa phase alone is not of
much help in predicting the date ofits end: what matters more is the dynamics
ofthe evolving business situation. The regularity ofbusiness cycles manifests
itself primarily in aspects ofsuch dynamics-persistent comovements ofspe-
cific indicators, the leads and lags involved, and so on. There is no evidence
that close and lasting periodicities exist in the recurrence of socially costly
recessions here or abroad, and there are good general reasons why they are
not visible. Important hidden periodicities may well exist, although even they
are not likely to be unique, well-defined, and stable.